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 Elizabeth Anscombe was a remarkable and formidable woman, and a very considerable 
philosopher.  Orders of intellectual greatness are hard to assign particularly when the subject in 
question belongs to one’s own time, but there is no question that Anscombe was one of the most 
gifted and accomplished philosophers of the twentieth century. Her work will continue to be read 
long into the future and a place for her in the history of philosophy is assured.  
 Her contemporary peers include the Americans: Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, 
Van Quine, and Wilfred Sellars; the British: John Austin, A.J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, and Peter 
Strawson; and the Europeans: Hannah Arendt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and 
Simone Weil.  Of these I would conjecture that Sellars, Strawson, and Ricoeur will be judged to 
be of enduring interest, and in overall comparison with those (or any others mentioned) 
Anscombe takes the lead. She was not a genius of the order of her teacher and friend 
Wittgenstein, but he may be the only twentieth century figure securely in that category, and does 
not quality as a contemporary peer having been born in the nineteenth century and only barely 
survived into the second half of the twentieth.  
 Among those who studied with her for various periods as undergraduates or graduates are 
several who themselves became eminent philosophers including Michael Dummett, Thomas 
Nagel, Onora O’Neill, and Charles Taylor, and three others - Sarah Broadie, Cora Diamond, and 
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Anthony Kenny - who appear in this special issue of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly on the philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe. 
 Considering her place in the category of women philosophers she is the clear leader, 
marked out by her creativity, imagination, industry, insight, range and rigour. There is also a 
kind of singularity about her work: she proceeds directly to the topic of her investigation, makes 
few references to contemporaries or to current trends, writes in a concentrated and often indirect 
manner, eschews academic jargon, generally avoids footnotes, and sometimes ends with an 
expression of perplexity. Again unlike most philosophers of her standing she engaged in 
philosophical analysis and argumentation before non-academic audiences. In this connection 
while she proportioned the depth of her thinking to their likely knowledge and comprehension 
she never resorted to glibness or misleading oversimplification.  
 Wherein lies her greatness? Among the elements composing this were her intellectual 
commitment, stamina, and toughness. Of themselves these do not make for brilliance, but 
without them there tends only to be, at best, unsustained cleverness. In addition she had 
tremendous powers of analysis and argument. She also had a ‘nose’ for fakes and mistakes, not 
the superficial yet pervasive sort that characterise the work of most philosophers in any period; 
but the deeper kind that give rise to ways of thinking that seem inescapable until the error and the 
escape routes are pointed out.  Into this category fall Descartes’ and Locke’s accounts of mind as 
co-extensive with consciousness, and of thought as only causally related to the world; Hume’s’ 
arguments regarding fact, value and practical normativity, and causality; and Kant’s 
disconnection of reason from nature. Moving down a league there are Bentham’s obliteration of 
the intended/foreseen consequence distinction, Quine’s double-standard as regards 
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extensional/scientific and intensional/everyday discourses, and Hare’s description/prescription 
gap. All of these were the subject of insightful and destructive Anscombean critiques.  
 In his Philosophical Lexicon, Daniel Dennett in one of his less clever and less witty 
entries gives two definitions of the verb ‘Anscombe’:  
 “v. (1) To gather for safe-keeping. "She anscombed with all the notes and 
letters." 
(2) To go over carefully, with a fine-tooth comb, in an oblique direction.”  
The first refers to her work as editor and translator of Wittgenstein; the second to her 
philosophical style. More apt, and deserving of the noun form: ‘Anscombes’, would have been 
what Dennett writes in definition of Bernard Williams: “The dream-sensation of running for 
one's life while wearing diving boots. "His comments on my paper gave me the [Anscombes]". 
Such were her analytical powers that the idea of being a focus of Anscombe’s critical attention 
might occasion nightmares. She was invariably frank, often brusque and sometimes harsh. I am 
not sure to what extent she intended to be rude, though something perceived as such might be in 
evidence where she regarded what had been said as stupid or vacuous, or suspected vainglorious 
pretension. In any event the simple fact of her applying her intelligence to claims and arguments 
would be enough to occasion anxiety, though she was also a supportive tutor and supervisor.  
 Elizabeth Anscombe died on 5 January 2001 within days of the passing of Quine with 
whom, through her husband Peter Geach, she had formed a personal friendship. While they were 
united in their attachment to rigour, to a belief in the importance of logic, and to a conviction that 
philosophy had been transformed by the work of Gottlob Frege, their own philosophical 
outlooks, and conclusions, could not have been more different: he being one of the foremost 
proponents of scientific materialism; she a teenage convert to Roman Catholicism and a lifelong 
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advocate of theological orthodoxy. Additionally, while Quine thought of philosophy as closely 
aligned with science and due to develop as the latter progressed, Anscombe, while respectful of 
science per se, was anti-scientistic and sceptical of attempts to solve philosophical questions by 
appealing to empirical theories. She also had no inclination to suppose that contemporary 
philosophy was in general an improvement on the thought of the past. In general, perhaps 
because there were more great figures there, and because Wittgenstein had dismantled the 
philosophy of Descartes which separated modern thought from its predecessors, she tended to 
look to earlier times than to the present or recent past. She had a particular feeling for 
philosophers from the pre-modern period, particularly Plato, Aristotle, Anselm and Aquinas, but 
also, though she studied them less, Spinoza and Kierkegaard. Of her contemporaries and juniors 
she appreciated the work of her friends Georg Von Wright and Philippa Foot, and that of Saul 
Kripke.  
II 
 Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe was born on 18 March 1919 the youngest of 
three children and only daughter of Alan Wells Anscombe, a science master at Dulwich College 
in South London, and of his wife Gertrude Elizabeth, a classics teacher, after whom she was 
named. Her father was an atheist and her mother a nominal Anglican. Before she entered her 
teenage years and up to the middle of them Elizabeth discovered Roman Catholicism by reading 
a book on the lives and work of Elizabethan English recusant priests, and read her way into the 
Catholic faith; but her parents were strongly opposed to her wish to become a Catholic and it was 
only on leaving Sydenham High School for Girls and getting to St Hugh’s College Oxford that 
she felt free to receive instruction preparatory to admission to the Church. 
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 At Oxford she studied ‘Greats’ (Classics and Philosophy) and in her first year became a 
Roman Catholic. Shortly thereafter she met Peter Geach, another philosopher convert, while both 
were in a Corpus Christi procession at the Servite Priory of St Philip a few miles north of 
Oxford. Like her he had been receiving instruction from the Dominican Fr Richard Kehoe of 
Blackfriars, Oxford.. They became engaged shortly thereafter and married at the Brompton 
Oratory in London on St Stephen’s Day (December 26) 1941. Earlier in the same year Anscombe 
had graduated with First Class Honours, secured by the brilliance of her philosophy scripts and 
in the face of her apparently comprehensive ignorance of ancient history.  
 ‘Miss Anscombe’, as she continued to be called, even by Geach (and through the course 
of having seven children) crossed in 1942 to Cambridge to take up the Sarah Simpson post-
graduate research studentship at Newnham College. It was in Cambridge that she met 
Wittgenstein who then held the Chair of Philosophy and whose lectures she attended, becoming 
increasingly enthusiastic about his revolutionary ideas. By 1946 she had returned to Oxford as a 
research fellow at Somerville College where she remained in one or another capacity (as college 
lecturer 1951, university lecturer 1958, and official college fellow from 1964) until her 
appointment to the Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge in 1970.  
 Between first meeting him and returning to Oxford, Anscombe maintained contact with 
Wittgenstein, travelling to Cambridge once a week to meet with him. In the course of that year 
1946-7 they became close friends. Obsessive about the originality of his own thought and 
somewhat misogynistic, she was one of the few academics Wittgenstein ever trusted, and he 
would address her affectionately as 'old man'.  Although he is quoted by Norman Malcolm as 
saying of Anscombe and of another philosopher convert, Yorick Smithies, that he "could not 
possibly believe all the things they believe", in his final year, when he knew he was dying, 
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Wittgenstein asked Anscombe to put him in touch with a "non-philosophical priest". That she did 
calling upon Fr Conrad Pepler OP. of Blackfriars, Cambridge. Notwithstanding that she effected 
the introduction, however, Anscombe never presumed that Wittgenstein had resumed the faith of 
his childhood, and speculations to that effect are wishful thinking. Early versions of these may 
have been encouraged by the following facts. 1) Fr Pepler did administer the last rites while 
Wittgenstein was still alive (though he had fallen into unconsciousness by then), 2) he was given 
a Catholic burial, and 3) members of his family subsequently arranged for the printing and 
distribution of an in memoriam card which in Catholic circles would normally be taken to 
indicate that the person remembered, and for whom prayers were sought, had died a practising 
Catholic. Anscombe regretted any encouragement that may have been given by these facts to the 
belief that Wittgenstein had returned to the Catholic faith. 
 Preparation for the task of translating Wittgenstein's work (written in German) had begun 
while he was still alive, but now she and the other two literary executors and editors (G. von 
Wright and Rush Rhees) set about the project of bringing material to publication. Anscombe 
took the lead in this, and the appearance in 1953 of her translation of Wittgenstein's masterpiece 
Philosophical Investigations was, without any question, one of the major turning points in 
twentieth century philosophy.  
 This was followed by her translations of other works: Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics (1956), Notebooks 1914-16 (1961), Zettel (1967) and (with Denis Paul) On 
Certainty (1969). She also concerned herself with Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy, publishing 
An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1959), and together with Geach translated 
Descartes’ Philosophical Writings (1954).  
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 Anscombe's appreciation of philosophers with whom she disagreed profoundly 
(principally Descartes and Hume) was marked, as was her range. She could write authoritatively, 
using her own translations, of Plato, Aristotle, Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Frege and 
Wittgenstein. But first and foremost she was neither an historian, a translator, nor an editor, but 
an original philosopher. Her short book Intention, first published in 1957 and republished by 
Harvard University Press in 2000, is universally regarded as a classic account of the nature of 
intentional behaviour, and as the founding text of the theory of action. In it she argued that 
intentional actions are ones to which a particular sense of the question ‘why?’ applies: one which 
seeks a reason that is provided either by identifying a backward-looking factor, such as that the 
agent is rectifying a failing or wrong, or a forward-looking one such as an immediate aim or 
further objective. Additionally, the performance of such actions is known to the agent non-
observationally. 
 Anscombe’s motive in investigating intention was her perplexity and frustration at 
attempts to excuse or minimise culpability by saying that an agent only intended immediate acts 
and that their foreseen and desired consequences were something distinct for which he might not 
be morally responsible. Thus she forged a link between philosophical and moral psychology 
which was further adverted to in her 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy", which introduced 
the term "consequentialism" into the English language. The writing of this had resulted in part 
from the desire to see what moral philosophers had to say about the determinants of the value of 
actions, and in part from the practical need to read ethical texts in preparation for tutoring the 
subject in Oxford which she had agreed to do in order to allow her Somerville College colleague 
Philippa Foot to take a period of study leave. Yet it is rightly credited as being the principal 
cause of the revival of an ethics focussed on virtue rather than on rule or outcome. Though 
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Anscombe never supposed that the whole of ethics could be done in terms of the concept of 
virtue and on that account she cannot correctly be termed a ‘virtue ethicist’.  
 Similarly, ‘Causality and Determination’, her inaugural lecture as Professor of 
Philosophy at Cambridge subverted, and some believe refuted, a centuries' old orthodoxy about 
the nature of causation, viz. that it is essentially necessitarian and/or lawlike. Instead she treated 
the notion of ‘causality’ as an abstraction formed on the basis of particular verbal descriptions 
such “cutting”, “pushing”, “tearing” and so on which are deployed in everyday observation and 
explanation. To the extent that there is a unifying core to these and hence to the notion of 
causality more generally it is, she suggested, that of derivativeness, of one thing ‘coming from’ 
or ‘being due to’ another. This approach connects with other themes in her work on 
epistemology and metaphysics where she subverts empiricist accounts and in the process blocks 
one route to scepticism. For Anscombe, here developing ideas from Wittgenstein, concepts 
which are specific instances of ones of substance, causation, and value, are not got by abstraction 
from experience but brought to it through the grammar of language. It is not a discovery that 
gold is a substance for ‘gold’ is a substantival term. 
 As indicated here, Anscombe's work was for the most part highly academic, usually 
difficult to comprehend, and often combative in expression. It sometimes took readers years to 
see the point of what she was arguing, but this was because she always took on the hardest 
problems and had no time for slick presentation. Rush Rhees quoted Wittgenstein as often saying 
"go the bloody hard way"; this is a direction Anscombe appears to have taken to heart. She is 
reported to have said to A.J. Ayer "if you didn't talk so quickly, people wouldn't think you were 
so clever" - though, in fairness his reply should also be quoted: "if you didn't talk so slowly, 
people wouldn't think you were so profound."  
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 From her student days, however, she had discussed and written about issues of moral, 
political and religious interests. In 1939 she co-authored a then highly controversial pamphlet 
predicting that Britain's conduct in the Second World War would be unjust, and in 1956/7 she 
protested the award by the University of Oxford of an honorary degree to President Truman, 
charging that he had commanded the murderous use of nuclear weapons against innocent 
Japanese civilians. Troubled by how people found it easy to defend Truman she came to the 
conclusion that they failed to understand the nature of his actions, and showed in Intention, that 
in doing one thing (moving one's hand) one may intentionally be doing another (directing the 
death of human beings).  
 In 1948, in debate with C.S. Lewis at the Socratic Club in Oxford she demolished his 
favoured argument against "the self-refuting character of naturalism". Where some apologists 
viewed this as giving comfort to the enemy (atheism), Anscombe characteristically saw herself 
as simply exposing bad argumentation. Her own verdict on the event "that it was an occasion of 
sober discussion of certain quire definite criticisms, which Lewis's rethinking and rewriting 
showed he thought were accurate" seems the correct one. In any event, no-one could seriously 
doubt her belief in the value of Christian apologetics if they read the likes of her pamphlets On 
Transubstantiation (1974), and on Contraception and Chastity (1977), where she argued 
passionately in favour of traditional Catholic teachings.  
 In 1967 Anscombe was elected Fellow of the British Academy. She subsequently 
received a number of other distinctions including foreign honorary member of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 1999 (along with Peter Geach) a Papal medal Pro 
Ecclesia et Pontifice. Three volumes of Anscombe's Collected Papers were published in 1981: 
From Parmenides to Wittgenstein; Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind; and Ethics, 
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Religion and Politics. Two collections of papers were dedicated to her: Intention and 
Intentionality (1979) and Logic, Cause and Action (2000), and together with Geach she was the 
recipient of a volume of essays Moral Truth and Moral Tradition (1994) published to honour 
their fifty years of marriage.  
 Since Anscombe’s death four further volumes of her writings have been published: 
Human Life, Action and Ethics (2005), Faith in a Hard Ground (2009), From Plato to 
Wittgenstein (2011), and Logic, Truth and Meaning (2015), and several collections of essays, 
and studies of her work have appeared - two of the authors of which, viz. Roger Teichmann and 
Rachel Wiseman are among the contributors to this issue. This special issue of the ACPQ adds 
further to the growing library of work by and about Anscombe (the main items of which are 
specified below) which is built upon and is further contributing to the renaissance of interest in 
her work. That promises to have several good outcomes. First, we will understand better the 
work of hers that was already known of. Second, we will gain further insight into areas and 
developments within her philosophy through engaging with hitherto unknown or neglected 
material. Third, we will be able to bring this knowledge to the ongoing effort to understand and 
resolve, so far as that it ever possible, some of the central questions of philosophy. 
 One of Anscombe's last pieces of philosophical writing was characteristically quirky but 
likewise also suggestive of hitherto unseen lines of enquiry. In "Russelm or Anselm?" 
Philosophical Quarterly, 43 (1993), she defended the thesis that Anselm's argument of 
Proslogion 2 could be saved "from the stupidity of an Ontological Argument" by deletion of a 
comma. This rests on the claim that in "Si enim in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, 
quod maius est" the second (later editorial) comma ought to be omitted; in which interpretation 
("if that than which nothing greater can be thought of exists only in the mind, something which is 
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greater can be conceived to exist also in reality"), the argument does not treat existence as a 
property of objects and so does not fall foul of Kant's objection. Writing of her defence 
Anscombe remarked: 
 [I have] thought harder about Anselm's argument than I did before. But I still 
think that I haven't thought hard enough. I don't know whether Anselm's argument 
is valid or invalid - only that it is a great deal more interesting than its common 
interpretation makes it.   
 The scholarship, imagination, boldness and honesty evident in this essay characterised 
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